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THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT
EXTENDED AND AMENDED
The summer of 1951 marked the first year of operation
under the primary statutory control mechanism supporting
our present mobilization effort, the Defense Production Act
of 1950.1 That Act, passed in the patriotic upsurge which
followed our entry into the Korean affair, has proved to be
substantially adequate in serving as the legal basis for the
great majority of executive orders 2 and administrative rules
and regulations ' needed to effectively mobilize, control and
stabilize the national economy. Attacks upon the legality of
the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the administrative
action taken thereunder have been rare and almost univer-
sally unsuccessful.' Previous expositions and analyses of the
Act in the law reviews I and elsewhere have emphasized the
obvious fact that the Act was not particularly novel in scope
or kind, but was, on the whole, merely an up-to-date reflec-
tion and compilation of the statutory control mechanisms of
World War II.
1 64 STAT. 798 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2061 et seq. (Supp. 1951).
2 For example, Exec. Order No. 10161, 15 FED. REG. 6105 (1950), delegated
priority, allocation, requisitioning, loan, procurement, stabilization and credit con-
trol powers; Exec. Order No. 10172, 15 FEn. REG. 6929 (1950), designated certify-
ing authority with respect to accelerated tax amortization; Exec. Order No. 10182,
15 FED. Rw. 8013 (1950), prescribed regulations for appointment of persons and
exempting them from conflict of interest statutes; Exec. Order No. 10193, 15
Fao. REG. 9031 (1950), bestowed over-all mobilization control authority in a
Director of Defense Mobilization; Exec. Order No. 10200, 16 FED. REG. 61 (1951),
established the Defense Production Administration; and Exec. Order No. 10281,
16 FD. REG. 8789 (1951), set up the Defense Materials Procurement Agency with
centralized authority to procure strategic materials.
3 See the calendar of formal actions taken by the federal agencies to imple-
ment the Defense Production Act. Hearings before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency on S. 1397, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1951).
4 No important court decisions have been rendered on the Defense Production
Act as of the date of this article.
5 Frey, Maintaining Economic Freedom Under the Defense Act of 1950, 18
U. or CBrr. L. REv. 218 (1951); Tyson, Manpower Aspects of the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950, 46 Ir. L. Rav. 1 (1951); Scanlan, The Defense Production Act
of 1950, 5 RUTGERS L. REV. 518 (1951).
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In spite of the fact that the Act represented no basic
change in the law of statutory control applied in the total
mobilization for World War II, nevertheless, it has served
the country effectively in the first year of partial mobiliza-
tion during the cold war era.6 Operating under its provisions,
we have been able to double the combined active strength
of our armed forces, and in the summer of 1951, there were
already approximately three million men under arms. We
have placed orders for over twenty-three billion dollars
worth of equipment.7 Industry is rapidly converting, deliver-
ies are coming up the production line at an ever-accelerating
rate, and defense expenditures have doubled since Korea,
now running at a rate of approximately two billion dollars
per month. Moreover, in addition to the increasing tempo
in placing orders and securing deliveries, substantial progress
has been made in the long range expansion of all productive
capacity, with our ultimate goal being the maintenance of
sufficient production lines to enable us to have our guns as
well as our butter.'
While it is true that our success thus far in mobilizing the
nation's industrial and military strength might not have been
accomplished without the statutory authority provided by
the Defense Production Act, nevertheless, progress under it
was not always smooth or successful.9 It was partially for
this reason that watchful and sometimes very vocal members
of congressional investigating committees gave ceaseless
6 See, in support of this conclusion, the testimony of Charles E. Wilson,
Director of Defense Mobilization, given before the House Committee on Banking
and Currency, House Hearings on H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1951).
7 Testimony of John Small, Chairman of the Munitions Board, id. at 84.
S "With the fullest degree of drive and unity, we can do this job by 1953.
By that date our readiness to enter upon total mobilization should be sufficient;
and production, in addition to meeting current military needs, should support a
civilian economy at or above pre-Korean levels." Building America's Might,
Report to the President by the Director of Defense Mobilization, April 1, 1951,
p. 2. The thesis that we can have more "butter" as well as guns has been
challenged. See, e.g., testimony of Professor Seymor Harris, Senate Hearings on S.
1397, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1540 (1951).
9 This was especially true of stabilization problems. Hearings, supra note 3,
at 25-7.
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attention to many phases of the administration of the Act
during the first ten months of its existence. Apart from the
Joint Committee on Defense Production, established by the
terms of the original Act itself,1" other congressional com-
mittees took to the field and to the hearing room frequently,
to check on the civilian control agencies and the military
departments as they performed their respective mobilization
duties. The spate of these congressional investigations em-
braced procurement, 1 military expenditures, 2 tax amortiza-
tion,13 Government loans, 4 parity, 5 price and wage con-
trol,'" and allocations. And above all things, there was
always the persistent inquiry, the ever-unanswered question,
"what about small business?" 1' Their investigations and
findings supplied much of the factual background for the
debate which pervaded the further extension and amendment
of the Act in the summer of 195 1."
In spite of the tremendous progress made under the De-
fense Production Act, as June, 1951 approached, it became
10 64 STAT. 820 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2162 (Supp. 1951). The Joint Com-
mittee, comprising five members from both the Senate and House, held extensive
hearings in which the officials of the civilian control agencies presented voluminous
testimony regarding the administration of the Act. Hearings before the Joint
Committee on Defense Production, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. February 8, 9, 13, March
8, 19, April 4, 12 (1951).
11 Report on Federal Supply Management, H. R. Rm. No. 658, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1951).
12 Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Ap-
propriations, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., May 7 (1951).
13 Hearings before Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production,
82d Cong., 1st Sess., March 19 (1951).
14 Certificates of Necessity and Government Plant Expansion Loans, H. R.
REP. No. 504, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., May 28 (1951).
15 Hearings, supra note 13, March 8 (1951).
16 Hearings, supra note 13, February 13, March 2 (1951).
17 See, e.g., Participation of Small Business in Military Procurement, Commit-
tee Print, Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., May,
1951; Small Business Clinic (Tucson, Arizona), Committee Print, Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., (April 16, 1951).
18 In addition, the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, headed by the aggressive Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas,
was constantly looking over the shoulder of administrative agencies, especially the
military. In its efforts to duplicate the vigilance of the Truman Committee of
World War II, it has received extensive publicity and published over forty
reports, which, in the opinion of some critics, were distinguished primarily by a
lurid prose and rhetorical flourish.
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necessary for the Congress to give attention to the extension
of the Act and its possible amendment. The greatest initia-
tive to that end of course came from the Administration
under the leadership of the Director of Defense Mobiliza-
tion. He was supported in the Department of Defense whose
representatives were aware that the defense program had
not yet achieved its maximum impact on the American econ-
omy. As the Director of Defense Mobilization testified to
the Congress, the greatest heed for controlling the flow and
use of scarce materials was yet to come.19 Similarly, the
greatest pressures on prices and wages were prospective.2"
Time is proving the accuracy of that prophecy. In spite of
the obvious need for the extension of the Defense Production
Act in order to continue our mobilization effort at an ever-
accelerating pace, and at the same time avoid the disasters
of mounting inflation, the general atmosphere of the times
was not propitious when the Congress began hearings on the
Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951. In the first
place, there was a strange lethargy on the part of the public,
an indifference, almost a somnolence, toward the whole prob-
lem of controls and inflation.21 Complaints about high prices
were intermingled in the same breath with warnings of the
evil that controls themselves represented. In the midst of
this paradoxical public reaction, the pressure group move-
ments which so often have had an influential effect in shaping
the course of legislation smoothly operated. Another factor
which militated against the extension and strengthening of
the Defense Production Act during the late spring and early
summer days of 1951 was the onslaught by the cattlemen
against roll back orders which the Office of Price Stabiliza-
19 Hearings, supra note 6, at 5.
20 Id. at 88.
21 Except for the large labor organizations, no consumer groups were
sufficiently concerned to testify during the hearings on the amendments. More
than one defense official speculated whether the American people have the "will"
to tolerate economic controls in a period short of all-out war. Defense Mobilization
Board Minutes 5, March 14, 1951.
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tion had placed upon certain meat products.22 This, com-
bined with the general distaste for the large army of "bu-
reaucrats" who were necessary to administer the law, pro-
duced an atmosphere not conducive to successful achieve-
ment of the goals which the Administration sought in
amendments to the Defense Production Act. Finally, in the
midst of hearings on the Defense Production Act, peace
negotiations were started in Korea, and it looked for a few
weeks at least as if hostilities in the Far East would soon be
terminated. Consequently, in spite of the warning of men in
high places that to terminate controls for that reason would
be disastrous,23 a strong undercurrent of sentiment grew
which argued that controls would no longer be necessary,
since peace was practically upon us. Contemporary events
attest to the gross error of that view.
Faced then with the attitudes discussed above, the Ad-
ministration adopted an unusual strategy as they attempted
to shepherd" the bill through the pitfalls of congressional
hearings and debates. Basically, that strategy 4 had three
objectives. The primary goal was to secure extension of the
Defense Production Act as it stood. Second in importance
was a resolution to prevent crippling amendments from being
added to the extended bill. Thirdly, and the least important
in spite of the fact that it received the most publicity, was
the plan to strengthen the Act as it then stood by amending
it in certain particulars. As these pages may reveal, that
strategy was in part successful and yet, in certain substantial
respects, manifestly unsuccessful. The purpose of this article
is to point out the particulars in which that strategy was
successful and those in which it was not, by referring to the
22 Hearings, supra note 6, at 279-82.
23 "Mr. Small. 'I couldn't tell you with more sincerity, Mr. Chairman, I
think unless this Act is extended we will have industrial chaos, inevitably."'
Hearings, supra note 6, at 90. Mr. Small is Chairman of the Munitions Board,
Department of Defense.
24 The strategy as discussed herein was outlined to this writer, among others,
on the eve of the amendment hearings by a responsible official of the Office of
Defense Mobilization.
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provisions of the amendments which were suggested, the
congressional reaction to them, and the final disposition of
them, either by defeat, modification, or unaltered inclusion
in the final draft of the bill as it became law on the 31st of
July, 1951.
Early in the spring of 1951 the Office of Defense Mobiliza-
tion began the process of coordinating with the other inter-
ested governmental agencies in the preparation of drafts of
amendments to be introduced to the Defense Production
Act.25 After many had been considered and more rejected,
the amendments thought necessary were introduced into
Congress. On the Senate side, a bill embracing the amend-
ments proposed by the Administration was introduced by
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, Senator Maybank of South Carolina,26 who,
though scrupulously fair in his conduct of the hearings, made
it clear that he introduced the bill on request, was not its
sponsor in all its parts, and in fact had reservations about
certain aspects of it. 27 In the House, the Chairman of the
House Banking and Currency Committee, Representative
Spence of Kentucky, introduced the Administration bill 28
and fought vigorously in its behalf, both before his commit-
tee and in the House debate which preceded final passage
of the bill. That the bill finally passed as it did must be
acknowledged in part as his accomplishment. However, both
the Senate and House Banking and Currency Committees
held long hearings which were very fairly conducted and at
which the voices of the public, including capital, labor and
25 "Mr. Wilson. 'They are the recommendations of all the agencies, the
various agencies that constitute the mobilization program. They all had their
hand in it and gave us their recommendations.'" Hearings, supra note 3, at 50.
26 S. 1397, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., April 26, 1951.
27 "The Chairman. '. . . I stated at the White House, in the presence of
Mr. Wilson, that there are some things in -the bill that I did not think much of.
I have to be convinced, as this hearing progresses, that such changes are necessary."
Hearings, supra note 3, at 68.
28 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., April 26, 1951, introduced by Mr.
Spence. Future references to -this citation will be with respect to amendments as
introduced, and not as finally passed.
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agriculture, as well as those of the Government officials
charged with administering the law, were fully heard. It is
doubtful whether any control bill in our history received the
extended consideration that these amendments did.
In spite of the fact that the amendments as introduced
actually would not have called for much additional govern-
mental control of the economy, and even though many of
the Government officials administering the law made it clear
that neither by desire nor training were they interested in
expanding their administrative authority,29 the amendments
encountered rough going. The hearings served as a general
review and re-examination of many of the controversial
problems that had arisen over the past year concerning the
statutory control of the economy under the Defense Produc-
tion Act. Agricultural groups, with congressional support,
were quick to strike at any attempt, real or imagined, to
interfere with the farm parity price concept and were very
critical of the price roll backs and slaughtering restrictions
imposed by the Office of Price Stabilization.3" Small business
representatives complained about the favoritism which larger
business allegedly enjoyed in receiving defense contracts and
in being allowed accelerated amortization on their plants and
facilities.31 Members of both the Senate and House commit-
tees were concerned lest the subsidy power be abused to the
point where "too much government" and "Socialism" might
rear their unwanted heads.32 Another school of thought took
the tack that direct controls like those over prices and wages,
and allocation and priority orders were all unnecessary, at
least until the direct controls, including credit restrictions
29 "Mr. Johnston. 'Gentlemen, as much as we dislike controls - and I heartily
agree with everything you have said about the dislike of controls and I am sure
everyone in this room agrees with that - as much as we dislike them, there are
times when it is essential in my opinion that -they be imposed."' Hearings, supra
note 6, at 210-1. Eric Johnston was then Economic Stabilization Director.
30 See, e.g., statement of H. M. Conway, Director of Research, National
Livestock Producers Association, Hearings, supra note 3, at 1333 et seq.
31 Id. at 94.
32 See, e.g., Hearings, sura note 3, at 409; Hearings, supra note 6, at 35.
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and stricter taxation restraints, were allowed a chance." At
the same time other groups and other Congressmen com-
plained that the credit restrictions already in existence were
too severe and were strangling certain industries as well as
discriminating against the defense worker. 4 Labor lamented
the lack of "real price control" 11 and indicated that unless
it was forthcoming, labor would move for further wage in-
creases to meet the mounting cost of living. In addition to
these major brickbats, the hearings on the Defense Produc-
tion Act amendments brought forth complaints about plant
dispersals, the failure to set up control machinery earlier, the
problem of rent controls and many others. That Congress
was finally able to extend the Act and amend it in certain
particulars was to some extent amazing in view of the storm
of oratory pro and con that accompanied the legislative his-
tory of the amendments to the Defense Production Act.
Priorities and Allocation
Title I of the original Defense Production Act provided
authority to assign priorities and allocate materials and fa-
cilities to promote the national defense. 6 In addition, it con-
tained anti-hoarding provisions which made criminal the
accumulation of scarce materials in excess of the reasonable
demands of business, personal or home consumption, or for
purposes of resale at prices in excess of prevailing market
prices. 7 Title I was a grant of authority which Congress
intended to be broadly used.3 It has been so used. Under it,
33 "Mr. Wolcott. '. . . There is a school of thought, however, that teaches
that there are certain orthodox methods of stabilizing our economy which have
not been used to their fullest capacity.'" Hearings, supra note 6, at 12. Mr.
Wolcott later failed in an attempt to amend the bill to provide that price, wage
and credit controls sections were not to be operative until and unless certain
individual contracts had been utilized. 97 Cong. Rec. 7985 (July 9, 1951).
34 Hearings, supra note 3, at 3301 et seq.
35 Statement of Walter Reuther, Hearings, supra note 3, at 2130 et seq.
36 64 STAT. 799 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2071 (Supp. 1951).
37 64 STAT. 799 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2072 (Supp. 1951).
38 "It is necessary that these powers should be broad and flexible because
limited or restricted or partial authority might even prove insufficient to accomplish
the desired end in the given situation, or might do more harm than good by
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for instance, the National Production Authority has been
able to set up a priority system to channel materials and
industrial capacity into direct defense production. Limita-
tion, simplification, standardization, prohibition and distri-
bution orders, as well as inventory control regulations and a
controlled materials plan, have been issued by the National
Production Authority and the other appropriate agencies.
In general, Congress in reviewing the administrative actions
taken under the original Title I of the Defense Production
Act felt that the flexible authority granted had been well
administered.39 For that reason there was little inclination to
tamper with that section of the Act, although Congress had
been petitioned to amend Title I to incorporate specific
formulas for the allocation of adequate materials to continue
civilian production wherever this was consistent with mili-
tary needs.4" Congress, however, realized that such amend-
ments might create undesirable inflexibility in the adminis-
tration of allocation and priority powers and, primarily for
that reason, rejected them.41
The bill which the Administration recommended for
amending the Defense Production Act contained only one
minor modification of Title I. This amendment would have
made it clear that the President could prescribe conditions
and exceptions to the permitted accumulation of scarce
materials under the anti-hoarding provisions of the Act.42
This amendment prevailed with the Congress, although it
was changed to spell out the congressional intent that any
exceptions or conditions must be made on a general class
basis and could not be used as a device to show partiality
to particular companies.
making it necessary to use a shotgun instead of a rifle in order to accomplish
a single purpose." SEN. REP. No. 2250, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1950).
39 SEN. REP. No. 470, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-4 (1951).
40 Id. at 13.
41 Ibid.
42 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1951).
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In addition to this minor change sponsored by the Admin-
istration, there were several other amendments to Title I
enacted which brought few cheers from those entrusted with
administering the Act. The first of these was the addition of
Section 101 (a) which provides that no restriction, quota or
other limitation shall be placed upon the quantity of live-
stock which may be slaughtered or handled by any proces-
sor." This amendment was added to the bill during debate
in the Senate" and the House," and had as its avowed
purpose the elimination of the slaughtering quota system
which the Office of Price Stabilization had established to
assure proper distribution of meat products and to enforce
ceiling prices for them. The proponents of the amendment
argued that the quota system curtailed production and that
the passage of the amendment would permit more stock to
be slaughtered, causing prices to fall. Opponents of the
amendment maintained that it would cause the channeling
of livestock into black markets, whereas until that time live-
stock could be reserved for reputable companies. Shortly
after the enactment of the slaughtering quota restriction
amendment, President Truman condemned it as one of the
sections of the Act which made effective control of inflation-
ary meat prices very difficult to achieve. He called for its
repeal and a bill aimed in that direction was brought before
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee.46
In addition, the amendments of 1951 added a new section,
101 (c), to Title I of the present Act. This new sub-section
provides that no imports of certain fats and oils, peanuts,
butter, cheese and other dairy or rice products shall be ad-
mitted to the United States before July 1, 1952, if the Secre-
tary of Agriculture should determine that these imports
43 Section 101, as amended by Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)
(July 31, 1951).
44 97 Cong. Rec. 7461 (June 27, 1951).
45 97 Cong. Rec. 8079 (July 10, 1951).
46 S. 2048, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced August 23, 1951, by Senators
Ferguson, Nixon and Welker.
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would impair domestic production or interfere with the
orderly domestic storing and marketing, or result in any un-
necessary expenditures to Government price-support pro-
grams." This amendment was aided on the floor of the
House 48 during the debate on the bill. According to its pro-
ponents, its purpose was to provide "continued encourage-
ment" for an industry which might be needed in time of
all-out war. On the other hand, its enactment soon provoked
complaints from some of our allies that the amendment was
a violation of existing treaty commitments and made a
mockery of the economic aid we gave them. In effect, we
were asking them to increase production and at the same
time refusing to buy their goods.49
However, an even more drastic limitation on imports
would have been permitted under an amendment to the Act
which the House Banking and Currency Committee reported
out favorably," but which was defeated on the floor. 51 It
would have amended the priority and allocation authority
to provide that whenever priorities or allocations are in
effect with respect to any raw material, the President should
prohibit the importation of any article or product manufac-
tured in whole or in part from such raw material. This so-
called Moulter amendment anticipated an evil of the last
war which arose when the domestic watch industry suffered
because foreign watches were imported into the United
47 Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(c) (July 31, 1951).
48 97 Cong. Rec. 8065 (July 10, 1951).
49 "Formal memoranda have already been received by the Department of
State from the Governments of Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands,
New Zealand, and Switzerland. Argentina, Australia, and Norway have also
protested. The first six nations named have protested action under Section 104
as being in violation of the letter and spirit of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, and detrimental to tariff concessions negotiated under GATT. Soine
of these countries have stated that this action on the part of the United States is
inconsistent with its actions in taking the lead in attempts to break down trade
barriers in Europe and elsewhere." Sur. RE'. No. 790, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951).
50 H.R. REP. No. 639, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1951).
51 Opponents of the amendment stressed the point that its passage might result
in needlessly preventing the United States from obtaining commodities which are
needed and could also mean that commodities might be directed to markets of
the communist bloc. 97 Cong. Rec. 8002 (July 9, 1951).
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States. Those responsible for the administration of the priori-
ty and allocation program in support of the defense effort
undoubtedly heaved a sigh of relief when this amendment
was defeated during the course of the legislative history.52
Requisitioning and Condemnation
Title II of the original Defense Production Act permitted
the requisitioning of equipment for supplies or component
parts needed for national defense, as well as the requisition-
ing of materials or facilities which might be necessary for
the manufacture, maintenance, or operation of the equip-
ment, supplies, or component parts. Congress also required
that the national defense need must be immediate, not per-
mitting delay or resort to other sources. And, even then, the
requisitioning must be based upon the condition that all
other means of obtaining the use of the property for the
United States upon fair and reasonable terms had been ex-
hausted.53 Congress, in permitting this drastic administration
power, felt that it was an indispensable complement to the
allocation and priority power granted under Title L" It was
not used at all during the first year of the administration
of the Act. This duplicates to some extent the experience
during World War II, where only 5% of the instances in
which requisitioning was resorted to involved actual refusal
to sell to the government. The great majority of World War
II requisitioning proceedings occurred because of title diffi-
culties or other legal impediments, or because of honest
differences of opinion about the value of the property.
The bill which the Administration sent to Congress con-
tained an amendment to Title II, which would have granted
condemnation authority.55 The original Title II of the De-
52 Ibid.
53 64 STAT. 799 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2081 (Supp. 1951).
54 "Properly used, however, this power [to requisition] is an indispensable
complement to the allocation and priority powers." SEN. REP. No. 2250, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1950).
55 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., April 26, 1951.
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fense Production Act permitted requisitioning of materials
or manufacturing facilities, but did not expressly permit the
requisitioning of property for use as command facilities, such
as land for an airfield or army barracks. At least, this is what
a literal reading of the original Title II revealed, although
some senators indicated that the original intention in drafting
Title II was to allow requisitioning for any defense pur-
pose.56 To clear up this point and to secure the same con-
demnation authority which Congress had provided in Title II
of the Second War Powers Act, the Department of Defense
drafted an amendment which would have permitted the con-
demnation of property for command, training and operation-
al facilities. In addition, the proposed amendment would
have permitted acquisition of the property before an actual
formal court order, which in many cases can be delayed for
a year or more by vexatious litigation.57 Furthermore, due
to a statutory qmission, the Department of the Navy did not
possess the full condemnation authority which an earlier
56 "Senator Capehart. 'As a member of this Committee who sat through the
hearings when the act was passed, it was my intention to give you the right to do
that (requisitioning land for any defense purpose]. Of course, I do not know how
you could acquire a factory building without acquiring the land it sits on, do you ?'
"Mr. Scanlan. 'No. Absolutely not. It was certainly the intention to allow
us to acquire land on which production facilities rested, but we were never sure,
and in fact the interpretation was rendered to the contrary, that it authorized
condemnation of land for command facilities. But -if your intention had prevailed,
we would have no real problem.'" Hearings, supra note 3, at 399.
57 Under the Declaration of Taking Act, 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C.
§ 258(a) (1946), an accurate land survey and map must be avidlable. This is
necessary since the Government is bound by the declaration of taking, and title
to the described area and all interests therein are irrevocably vested unless the
owner consents to dismissal. The acquiring authority must deposit in court an
estimate of just compensation on a tract by tract basis. This requires the procure-
ment of appraisals plus, possibly, supplementary information and the recommenda-
tion to the Secretary of estimated amounts for deposit. The parties in interest and
the extent of their holdings must be definitely known since the deposits are allocated
for their use by -withdrawal from the registry of the court in advance of the final
determination of compensation. In like manner, this requires the procurement of
title services, preparation of certificates or abstracts and review. It may be
observed at this point that both the appraiser and the title searcher are seriously
handicapped and delayed unless an accurate survey of the site, tract by tract,
delineating the individual ownerships, is available. This survey is distinct from
any over-all perimeter which constitutes only the external boundary of the site
to be acquired.
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1917 Act " vested in the Secretary of War, and which a
transfer order under the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended,"9 had extended to the Department of the Air
Force. Passage of the proposed condemnation amendment
would have rectified this anomalous situation.
During the course of the legislative history, the proposed
condemnation amendment was vigorously challenged by sev-
eral members of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency 60 and by members of the House Committee.61 In spite
of the fact that the proposed amendment was ostensibly
identical with the condemnation authority granted during
World War II, Congress, not satisfied that there was need
for it, rejected the proposal. However, the bill as finally en-
acted did contain authority to acquire real property for
defense purposes by purchase, donation or other means of
transfer and by condemnation.62 The original requisitioning
section was amended to prohibit the requisitioning of real
property except in a limited area. In general, the condemna-
tion authority granted appears merely to be a restatement of
powers already existing by virtue of the Declaration of
Taking Act of 1931,63 and does not add to the authority that
the military departments already possess in this field.
Furthermore, the House version of the new condemnation
authority would have required that before it was exercised
for the use of the military services, they would have been
required to come into agreement with the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and House with respect to
the terms of individual acquisitions.64 This provision was
inserted at the request of Congressman Vinson, Chairman
58 40 STAT. 241 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 171 (1946).
59 61 STAT. 496 (1947), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Supp. 1951).
60 Hearings, supra note 3, at 396-404.
61 Hearings, supra note 6, at 117-9.
62 64 STAT. 799 (1950), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 2081 (a) (Supp. 1951), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (July 31, 1951).
63 46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258(a) (1946).
64 H.R. REP. No. 639, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
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of the House Committee on Armed Services, but was deleted
by the conference on the bill and does not appear in the Act
as it finally passed.
That the condemnation authority finally granted was
less than that originally requested is perhaps immaterial,
since there are other legislative alternatives. For instance,
Section 18(c) of the Selective Service Act of 1948 permits
the seizure of a facility of a manufacturer who refuses or
fails to comply in filling a mandatory order placed with him
for the delivery of goods for the use of the armed services.6"
The plant seizure provisions of an earlier Selective Service
Act 66 were utilized during World War II when manufac-
turers were recalcitrant, or when labor disputes had closed
down important defense plants." Section 18(c) could be
used again if the occasion demands it. In addition, the emer-
gency strike provisions of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 " furnish another method of forcing the con-
tinuation of production in vital industry.
Expansion of Productive Capacity and Supply
Title III of the original Defense Production Act was de-
signed to expand the productive capacity and supply of the
economy. Several means were provided. There was the guar-
anteed loan program,69 which, like the "V" loan program
of World War II, permitted Government agencies, including
the military departments, to guarantee loans made by pri-
vate sources to defense manufacturers. These guarantees
were designed primarily to support working capital loans,
65 62 STAT. 626 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 468(c) (Supp. 1951).
66 54 STAT. 892 (1940), as amended, 57 STAT. 164 (1943). The earlier Selective
Service Act provisions permitted, in express terms, seizure of plants where labor
disputes impeded the war effort. The present Selective Service Act impliedly
covers the labor dispute situation.
67 Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Corp. v. Badeau, 55 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Ky.
1944).
68 61 STAT. 155-6 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (Supp. 1951). Of course, the
remedy here is not seizure but rather the deterrent effect of the contempt power
of the federal courts.
69 64 STAT. 800 (1950) ; So U.S.C. App. § 2091 (Supp. 1951).
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as opposed to loans for the expansion of productive facilities.
Title III of the Act accomplished plant expansion by author-
izing direct Government loans, through the medium of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation with certification of
the appropriate delegate agency, to be made to private enter-
prise which could not secure the capital elsewhere for the
expansion of facilities needed for national defense." In addi-
tion, the original Title III provided a form of subsidy
through the use of the guaranteed purchase contract, and
also authorized governmental purchase of metals, minerals,
and other raw materials for Government use and for resale,
even at a loss if necessary, to private industry.71 Finally,
Section 303 (d) of the original Title permitted the installa-
tion of additional equipment, facilities or improvements in
Government plants, and the installation of Government-
owned equipment in privately-owned facilities. At the same
time, an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code 72 author-
ized accelerated tax amortization to companies investing in
defense facilities as an incentive device.
Under these various media, the expansion rate of the
economy between the first quarter of 1950 and the first
quarter of 1951 rose by 10%, and during the fourth quarter
of 1950 the annual rate of production of goods and services
reached the three hundred billion dollar mark, approximate-
ly equal in real output to the peak war year of 1944. 73 How-
ever, despite the progress made in this direction, there were
many complaints, both within the walls of Congress and
without, aimed at the administration of certain of the expan-
sion programs. This was especially true of accelerated tax
amortization, where the complaints of favoritism leveled by
70 Id., 50 U.S.C., § 2092.
71 Id., 50 U.S.C., § 2093.
72 INT. REV. CODE § 124, as amended by 64 STAT. 939 (1950), 26 U.S.C. § 124
(a) (Supp. 1951). Accelerated amortization has received a fair share of criticism
from some quarters who regard it as a business "hand out." The Hardy Sub-
committee characterized the program as "a shovel in the barrel" approach. H.R.
REP. No. 504, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
73 Building America's Might, op. cit. supra note 8.
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small business representatives and others mounted in inten-
sity. 4 In contrast, however, at the same time there was
bitter congressional criticism of several of the direct Govern-
ment loans that had been granted to small and financially
unstable enterprises.75 In addition to finding themselves in
this "damned if we do and damned if we don't" dilemma,
the administrators of our defense program were criticized
for failure to act more rapidly to effect metal and mineral
expansion."
As mentioned above, under the original Title III, metals,
minerals and other "raw materials" could be purchased by
the Government for its own use or for resale. In the ad-
ministration of this provision, some difficulties were encoun-
tered due to the ambiguity of the term "raw materials."
For instance, it was not clear that the section as it then
stood would authorize the purchase of materials in more
advanced stages of production, such as sheet metal or extru-
sions. For this reason, an amendment was proposed which
would delete the word "raw" preceding the word "materials,"
and thus make clear that the purchase authority granted
was broad enough to include materials generally.77 While this
proposed amendment received some congressional criticism,
due primarily because of its tie-up with the subsidy concept,
nevertheless, it did pass. This may have been due in some
measure to the testimony of Department of Defense repre-
sentatives, who pointed out that the broadened authority
could be used for placing pool orders on machine tools and
some types of electronics equipment. 8 Machine tool short-
74 See, e.g., Inquiring into the Policy, Procedure and Program Involving
Granting of Certificates of Necessity and Defense Loans, House Hearings, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess., March 19, 20, April 5, 9, 20, and 23 (1951).
75 "The subcommittee wishes to express itself clearly and without qualification
that loans of the Hazelton type are not in the public interest." H.R. REP. No. 504,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1951).
76 See, e.g., Egan, Need of Subsidies in Defense is Seen, N.Y. Times, March
23, 1951, p. 29, col. 1.
77 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1951); [1951] U.S.C. Cong. &
Adm. Serv. 1841-2.
78 See, e.g., testimony of Munitions Board, Chairman Small, Hearings, supra
note 3, at 404-5.
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ages constituted a tremendous bottleneck to the expansion
of productive facilities and the satisfaction of military re-
quirements.
The second amendment proposed by the Administration
to the original Section 303(a) of the Defense Production
Act was directed at eliminating the language of the Section
as it then stood which restricted the purchases of agricultural
commodities for resale to industry use and stockpiling only. 9
This original limitation, of course, represented congressional
vigilance to insure that the Defense Production Act was not
used as a price control mechanism by which farm prices
could be deflated by governmental purchase and dumping of
agricultural commodities on the market. However, the
amendment proposed did not go this far; it only authorized
the removal of the restriction on imported agricultural com-
modities, thus permitting their purchase and resale for
stabilization purposes. It would not permit the purchase
of domestic agricultural commodities for these purposes. The
amendment passed, although Congress inserted a proviso
prohibiting imported commodities purchased thereunder
from being sold at less than the established ceiling price, or
if no ceiling price had been established, at less than the
current domestic market price. Moreover, Congress provided
that no commitment to purchase imported agricultural com-
modities could be made which called for delivery more than
one year after the expiration of the Act. The law, as amend-
ed, thus permits the purchase and resale of imported agri-
cultural commodities at a loss when the price in the world
market for the commodity has reached a point where resale
at the world market price (which would have been necessary
before the amendment) would add to the inflationary pres-
sure in the domestic economy. According to testimony before
Congress, this broadened authority was regarded as merely
"stand-by," to be used when necessary in those limited areas
79 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1951).
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where foreign-produced commodities play a significant role
in our domestic economy.
80
Much more controversial than the two amendments dis-
cussed above was an amendment proposed by the adminis-
tration which would have granted limited subsidy authority,
or, as some called it, "differential subsidy" authority. The
amendment provided that, in order to assure the continuance
of necessary domestic production and to aid in assuring sta-
ble prices in the face of temporary increases in certain costs
of operation, authority was granted to make limited subsidy
payments to high-cost domestic producers of materials or
purchasers of agricultural commodities and to producers
whose temporary increases in production, distribution, or
transportation costs threatened to impair maximum produc-
tion or supply of a material.81
As might be expected, the proposal to grant -subsidy
powers was subjected to a great amount of criticism during
the hearings. Several senators and representatives voiced
their fears that it could be utilized as a substitute or indirect
"Brannan Plan" to control agricultural production and
prices.8 2 In spite of this vigorous opposition to the proposed
subsidy authority, the need for it was spelled out at great
length by witnesses for the Government during the hearings.
They pointed out that the subsidy authority was required
to protect the economy from temporary increases in costs
resulting from the needs of the mobilization program. Similar
authority was used effectively during World War II when
the subsidy technique furnished a means of maintaining
necessary production without adding to inflationary pressure,
80 "Mr. Wilson. I... It may be necessary for the Government to purchase
agricultural commodities for purposes other than stockpiling or industrial use.
In addition, the resale of imported agricultural commodities at a loss should be
permitted when the price in the world market for the commodity has reached
the point where resale at the world market price would add to the inflationary
pressures in the domestic economy. This broadened authority should be available
to us on a standby basis should our mobilization program require such action."'
Hearings, supra note 6, at 6.
81 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a), (b), (c) (1951).
82 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 41.
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since only the marginal producers received it. However, while
the Defense Production Act amendments, as finally passed,
contain limited subsidy authority, they were cut down con-
siderably from those originally asked by the Administration.
The requested power was definitely erased as to agricultural
commodities, and limited to raw or non-processed material
where there might be a decrease in supply from high cost
sources, or where there was a temporary rise in the costs of
transportation which threatened to impair the maximum
production or supply of materials. Congress further sur-
rounded the subsidy authority granted with what it re-
garded as precautionary prerequisites inhibiting its use, by
requiring certain findings to be made 83 and by admonishing,
in the committee reports on the bill, that the authority
granted was to be used sparingly.84 That this parsimonious
use was the original intent had been many times professed
by officials of the control agencies during their testimony on
the bill. While Congress took them at their word, it took
steps to insure that they kept it.
Another provocative amendment sought by the Adminis-
tration was one which would have provided authority for
the construction and operation by the Government of facili-
ties for the manufacture and marketing of materials needed
for national defense. This power, if granted, would have
83 "(c) If the President finds - (1) that under generally fair and equitable
ceiling prices for any raw or nonprocessed material, there will result a decrease
in supplies from high-cost sources of such material, and that the continuation of
such supplies is necessary to carry out the objectives of the Act; or (2) that an
increase in cost of transportation is temporary in character and threatens to
impair maximum production or supply in any area at stable prices of any materials,
he may make provision for subsidy payments on any such domestically produced
material other than an agricultural commodity in such amounts and in such
manner (including purchases of such material and its resale at a loss without regard
to the limitations of existing law), and on such terms and conditions, as he
determines to be necessary to insure that supplies from such high-cost sources are
continued, or that maximum production or supply in such area at stable prices of
such materials is maintained, as the case may be." Section 303 (c), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(b) (July 31, 1951); [1951] U.S.C.
Cong. & Adm. Serv. 1692.
84 H.R. REP. No. 639, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 25 (1951). House Conference Rep.
No. 770, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (July 27, 1951).
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duplicated the authority given the Defense Plants Corpora-
tion in World War II, and it would have enabled the Govern-
ment to build facilities, with due consideration being given
to their strategic location, and to construct plants which pri-
vate industry would not undertake, because of their lack of
utility for peacetime purposes.85 For instance, as Govern-
ment witnesses asserted during the hearings, there are cer-
tain types of military production in which individuals do not
wish to invest, and in those instances it is exceedingly diffi-
cult to procure the necessary facilities without making com-
mitments which involve high costs to the Government and
practically no risk to the investor. Moreover, private capital,
even with the maximum incentives available, might not
necessarily wish to construct new plants in areas thought
to be strategic from the point of view of defense, yet un-
economical from the point of view of investment." Testi-
mony of the Department of Defense representatives sup-
porting this amendment cited the possible need for this
defense plant corporation authority in areas where there is
no civilian counterpart for the item produced, for example,
85 "(e) When in his judgment it will aid the national defense, the President
is authorized (1) to acquire by purchase, donation, condemnation, or other means
of transfer any real property, including facilities, or other -interests therein, and to
erect and construct plants, factories ; and other industrial facilities for the purposes
of manufacturing, producing and processing materials necessary to the national
defense and to engage in the marketing, transportation, and storage of such
materials; (2) to install additional equipment, facilities and processes in, and
construct additions and improvements to, plants, factories, and other industrial
facilities owned by the United States Government; (3) to operate, lease, license
or otherwise arrange for the use by others of such plants, factories and industrial
facilities; and (4) to install Government-owned equipment, facilities, and processes
in plants, factories and other industrial facilities owned by private persons. To the
fullest extent the President deems practicable, a fair charge shall be made for the
use by others of Government-owned property facilities, and processes under the
authority of this subsection, in order to reimburse the Government for the cost
incurred by it." H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (e) (1951).
86 "Mr. Wilson.. . . 'Moreover, private capital, even with the maximum incen-
tives, is frequently unwilling or unable to locate new plants in strategic locations
which necessarily involve such economic disadvantages as to make the plants useless
to them under normal competitive conditions. For these reasons, the Government
should be authorized to construct and operate defense plants as was the case during
World War H. This authority would be utilized only in those comparatively few
instances where private industry would not or could not undertake expansions at
reasonable -terms in the national interest.' " Hearings, supra note 3, at 25.
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in areas where ammunition depots and shell loading plants
are needed.17 In addition, the Department of Interior
thought that authority might be required in processing
certain rare metals, such as magnesium.8" Finally, the au-
thority, if granted, would have been another weapon to use
when negotiating with private industry for expansion in
certain areas where it otherwise might be reluctant to do so,
unless it realized that, if needed, the Government might in-
vest and compete.
In spite of these arguments, Congress was not disposed to
grant the authority requested. Although the House bill as
reported did contain the amendment, 9 it met vigorous oppo-
sition in the Senate. Senator Capehart thought it could be
too easily abused and could be utilized to put the Govern-
ment in competition with normal private industry, such as
the automobile industry. Other senators referred to the
beneficial elimination of monopolies in the postwar disposal
of surplus plants and facilities owned by the Defense Plant
Corporation of World War II."' Although Senator Benton
also pointed out that accelerated amortization was much
more expensive and more conducive to monopoly growth
of the larger corporations than the establishment of a defense
plants corporation authority would be, his amendment to
that effect was defeated on the floor in the Senate,92 and the
original provision of the House bill was also deleted on the
floor of the House.9 3 The argument that prevailed was that
the authority, if granted, would be too great a step toward
nationalization of industry. Representative Javitts attempt-
ed to meet this opposition by requiring the certification of
the Director of Defense Mobilization in each case before
87 Hearings, supra note 3, at 408.
88 Id. at 454.
89 H.R. REP. No. 639, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1951).
90 Hearings, suprwa note 3, at 409-12.
91 Id. at 412.
92 97 Cong. Rec. 7577, 7584 (June 28, 1951).
93 97 Cong. Rec. $260 (July 12, 1951).
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the Government could acquire plants and facilities.94 How-
ever, even this resort to the high prestige of Mr. Charles E.
Wilson failed. The 1951 amendments to the Defense Pro-
duction Act do not permit the acquisition of plants and
facilities by the Government, but merely continue the origi-
nal provisions in Title III which allowed additions to plants
and facilities already owned by the Government.
There were other minor flurries of amendments to Title
III. For instance, the Administration, in the initial bills
introduced in the House and Senate, sought to change the
limitations which existed in Section 304(b) and (c) on
authorized funds, and to provide, by means of specific ap-
propriations, for determination of the amounts to be made
available to carry out the procurement, loan and production
activities authorized by Title III. While the Administration
was unsuccessful in this objective, Congress did revise the
appropriation authority of Section 304(b) of the Act by
increasing the amount, authorized to be borrowed and placed
in a revolving fund to carry out Title III functions, from 6
hundred million dollars to 2 billion, 100 million dollars. In
addition, Congress provided that for the purpose of the anti-
deficiency statutes, the liability entailed in operations under
Sections 302 and 303 of Title III was to be reckoned on a
probable ultimate net liability basis, rather than on a gross
contingent liability basis which had been the situation during
the first ten months of the Act's existence, and which of
course took a larger amount out of the revolving fund avail-
able.9" Under the new authority, for instance, a purchase
contract guaranteed by the Government would be reckoned
as a liability only to the extent that there might be a proba-
ble ultimate net loss, rather than to the extent of the total
94 97 Cong. Rec. 8350 (July 13, 1951).
95 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., April 26, 1951.
96 Section 304 (b) as amended by Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 103(b) (July 31, 1951).
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amount of the contract outstanding. This substantially in-
creases the liquidation of funds supporting defense pro-
duction activities.
Another area in which there were some attempts to change
Title III was that of plant dispersal. Senator O'Mahoney
in the Senate 11 and Representative Rains 91 in the House
introduced amendments which would have required that,
in the construction and expansion of plants and other facili-
ties assisted by Government aid in the form of loans or tax
amortization, there should be dispersal of facilities so far as
practicable. Senator O'Mahoney's amendment would have
required consideration of the following questions: (1) whe-
ther the areas concerned had sufficient natural resources;
(2) whether the areas were fully utilizing their labor forces;
(3) were relatively underdeveloped industrially; (4) had not
retained their natural increase in population; and, (5) were
relatively invulnerable to enemy attack by reason of geo-
graphical location or due to the absence of heavy concentra-
tion of population or vital defense industries. The attack
on these proposed amendments did not follow party lines,
but, as might have been expected, brought forth geographi-
cal alliances between the senators and representatives from
industrialized areas of the country, especially in New Eng-
land, against the representatives of the less populous areas
of the country. Although the proponents of the dispersal
amendments took pains to explain that it was not the purpose
of their amendments to remake the United States from an
economic point of view, their assurances evidently were un-
convincing to their colleagues and the amendments were
defeated. Later, the President, upon the advice of The Na-
tional Security Resources Board, issued a plant dispersal
policy statement which received some criticism as an attempt
to do by executive order what Congress had rejected pre-
viously. However, an analysis of the President's policy makes
97 97 Cong. Rec. 7448 (June 27, 1951).
9s 97 Cong. Rec. 8164 (July 11, 1951).
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it clear that he was referring to the dispersal only of new and
expanding industries, not in one section of the country as
opposed to another, but rather dispersal within small geo-
graphical areas. Thus, the erection of a new plant several
miles from a heavily industrialized area still would conform
to the policy proclaimed. 9 In spite of the vital security con-
siderations involved, it appears that relocation of vital de-
fense industries in the United States must await the coming
of the first enemy atomic bomb.
Stabilization
Under Title IV of the original Defense Production Act, the
President was authorized to take price and wage stabilization
measures. However, the stabilization authority granted at
that time was restricted in two important respects. In the
first place, by the terms of Section 402(b) (3) of the Act,
once a price ceiling was established for a particular material
or service, wages then had to be stabilized in the particular
industry or business producing the material or performing
the service, regardless of the fact that wages in that industry
might be below the national average. Secondly, the original
Defense Production Act protected Government price support
of agricultural commodities by forbidding the establishment
of ceilings on agricultural commodities below parity.
In addition to the restrictions on effective stabilization
that arose out of the patchwork nature of Title IV, adminis-
trative action under it was rather slow in getting under way.
99 "It is recognized that major centers of industrial production have become
fairly integrated and that part of their efficiency is due to their concentration.
Dispersion policy, to be effective and realistic, must not be allowed to cripple the
efficiency of the productivity of our established industries lest the remedy become
worse than the ill. Our policy, therefore, must be directed mainly toward the
dispersal of new and expanding industries.
"Sites which need dispersion security standards can be found in local marketing
areas adjacent to industrial and metropolitan districts in all sections of the country.
"Thus, this policy can be made to fit the economic and social pattern of any
part of the country." Statement of Policy on Industrial Dispersion, issued by the
President in a letter to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, August
10, 1951.
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In fact, the original appointee to the post of Economic Sta-
bilization Director proved to be a unique choice for a top
control position, since he continued to adhere to the theory
of "voluntary controls" while prices and wages continued
their unprecedented rise upwards.' 0 However, after replace-
ments of personnel in this job and others, a general price and
wage freeze was issued in January, 1951, and from that time
on the stabilization program took a change for the better,
even though a "creeping" inflationary trend still seems to
be with us. The Director of Defense Mobilization reported
that the Consumers Price Index showed virtually no change
between March and August, 1951.101 Moreover, wholesale
prices have, on the average, continued the slow decline that
began in March of 1951, and by the 25th of September were
3.9% below the peak reached six months earlier. On the
other side of the chart, rises in wages since the general freeze
order have been moderate. Nevertheless, despite the present
relative stability, the strong inflationary pressures that arise
as defense spending grows and personal and business incomes
increase continue to threaten.
To meet these continued inflationary threats, the Adminis-
tration proposed several changes in the Act which would
have strengthened the stabilization provision with respect
to price, wage and rent controls. The first would have allow-
ed price ceilings on agricultural commodities. There was no
attempt to knock out the prohibition against setting agricul-
tural ceilings below parity, but in order to facilitate the
administration of that requirement, it was proposed that, for
stabilization purposes, the parity price of an agricultural
commodity should be the parity price which existed at the
beginning of the marketing season or year for that com-
100 Mr. Valentine, the original Director of Economic Stabilization, was finally
replaced. Incidentally, Mr. Di Salle as Director of the Office of Price Stabilization
proved to be a dynamic figure in a difficult field where, without dynamism and a
thick skin, an administrator is almost useless.
101 Three Keys to Strength, Third Quarterly Report to the President by the
Director of Defense Mobilization, 30 (October 1, 1951).
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modity.1°2 This revision would have enabled the Office of
Price Stabilization to establish, for an agricultural com-
modity which had reached parity, a ceiling which would be
stable for the remainder of the marketing season. However,
the agricultural block, both within Congress and without,
vigorously opposed even this slight tampering with the parity
principle, and the amendment was defeated, although it was
favorably reported out in the House version of the bill.'
The second major proposal in the realm of stabilization
was one which would have perhaps tightened up the admin-
istrative enforcement procedure. This was a request by the
Administration for licensing authority similar to that ac-
corded price control agencies in World War II.104 Under the
authority sought, all businesses would be automatically li-
censed but, after repeated warnings of price violations, they
might suffer suspension of their license for a period not to
exceed 12 months. This tonic also was too strong for Con-
gress to take, and the licensing provision never saw the light
of day in the reports of either the House or Senate commit-
tees.
In addition to the defeat of the amendments they had
requested, even more disappointing to the Administration
were certain stabilization provisions which were in the Act
as it finally emerged from Congress. The first of these was
the limitation on the roll-back of agricultural prices. In the
spring of 1951, the Office of Price Stabilization had issued a
number of temporary regulations in an attempt to roll back
excessive prices and restore reasonable order to the price
market while the long-run pattern of fair prices was to be
worked out. Some of these roll-backs were applicable to
agricultural commodities. Those applied to beef provoked
a furor from the cattlemen who descended upon Washington
en masse and heaped invective criticism on the head of the
102 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(b) (1951).
103 H.R. REP. No. 639, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
104 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(h) (1951).
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harried Mr. Di Salle, then Director of the Office of Price
Stabilization. As a matter of fact, the impact of the cattle-
men s protests probably was responsible for more than one
of the limitations on stabilization authority which Congress
then proceeded to put in the Act.
The first one of these was an anti-price roll-back amend-
ment, Section 402 (d) (3), which provides: "No ceiling shall
be established or maintained for any agricultural commodity
below 90% of the price received (by grade) by producers
on May 19, 1951, as determined by the Secretary of Agri-
culture."
However, the provisions against roll-backs on agricultural
commodities had an effect beyond that immediate area.
When the Senate and House bills went to conference, the
House had adopted the limitation on agricultural but not
industrial roll-backs, whereas the Senate, in addition to
prohibiting agricultural roll-backs, also forbade roll-backs
below current price levels as of January-February, 1951.
When these were brought to conference, differences were re-
conciled in what has now become the much-discussed "Cape-
hart Amendment." '05 The differences between the House
and Senate bills regarding industrial roll-backs were compro-
mised by allowing industrial roll-backs beyond the January
25, 1951 price level, if industry-wide cost increase or de-
crease adjustments were allowed. Also, the compromise
added a provision which would allow an individual seller,
upon a proper showing, to have any selling price adjusted to
cover increases in his prices and costs since June 24, 1950.
This adjustment amendment, labeled the "roll forward
amendment" by opponents, was immediately attacked by
spokesmen for the Administration as being unworkable at
best, and terribly inflationary at worst.'0 6 Since the amend-
ment required that price ceilings reflect changes in practi-
105 House Conference Rep. No. 770, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 23-4, (July 27,
1951).
106 SEN. REP. No. 470, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-34 (1951); [19511 U.S.C.
Cong. & Adm. Serv. 1815 et seq.
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cally all costs up to July 26, 1951, and required the measure-
ment of changes in overhead costs per unit of output on
the basis of individual products, it did pose tremendous
problems for those called upon to administer it. The Direc-
tor of Defense Mobilization, supporting the President,
charged that the amendment could only result in higher
price ceilings, and that with manufacturing profits at near
peak levels and with provisions already in the law permitting
adjustment for an industry or individual "squeeze" by price
ceilings, there was no need for the higher price ceilings pro-
vided by the amendment." 7 After a caustic attack on the
amendment by the President, legislation was introduced to
repeal it. It passed the Senate but was still pending in the
House of Representatives when the first session of the 82d
Congress came to an end.10 8 Its fate is uncertain since it
apparently has become exclusively a matter of partisan
politics.
In addition to the amendment discussed, there are several
other provisions, in the amended Defense Production Act
which presumably did not contribute much in the effort
to hold the price line. One amendment forbids the reduction
of distributors' margins below their customary percentage
margins immediately prior to Korea.1"9 As the Director of
Defense Mobilization pointed out, this amendment disre-
gards the usual fact that the increase in distributors' operat-
ing costs is rarely proportionate to the increase in the cost
of their merchandise." 0 In effect, this amendment may well
assure that all price increases at the wholesale level will be
passed on to the consumer, although legislation has been
introduced for its repeal as a result of the President's attack
on it."'
107 Three Keys to Strength, op. cit. supra note 101, at 35.
108 S. 2048, 82d Cong., Ist Sess., Aug. 23, 1951.
109 Section 402 (k), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 104(h) (July 31, 1951).
110 Three Keys to Strength, op. cit. supra note 101, at 35.
111 S. 2048, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 23, 1951.
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The paucity of amendments proposed to change the wage
stabilization authority existing under the Defense Produc-
tion Act, belies the fact that wage stabilization was one of
the more argumentative areas of administrative action dur-
ing the first year of the Act's existence. For instance, the
clash which organized labor had with the Director of Defense
Mobilization concerning the wage formula was one of the
more explosive developments during the first year. 112 After
peace had been reached on this front, the Wage Stabilization
Board was reconstituted in a way which made labor a bit
more amenable to the wage freeze. There was at least one
attempt on the floor of Congress to introduce an amendment
that would have reconstructed the Wage Stabilization Board
so that the public members would at all times outnumber the
labor and industry representatives. This amendment was
defeated on the floor of the House after an all-out campaign
of opposition by labor." 3
In rent stabilization the situation was different and much
was accomplished, although not all that the Administration
had originally requested. Under the terms of the bill which
the Administration had introduced in the Senate and House,
federal rent control would have been re-established on a
national scale, with the President being granted the authority
to establish maximum rents on housing and business accom-
modations in any area where he deemed it necessary. Maxi-
mum rents would have been the maximum rents effective on
the date of the Defense Production Act amendments of 1951,
with provision for adjustments in rents to cover increases in
operating and maintenance costs for which landlords had not
been compensated previously." 4
112 Whether the dispute between the representatives of organized labor and
Mr. Wilson was due to personality clashes or stemmed from disagreement over
vital policies was never clear to this writer. However, with the establishment of a
National Advisory Board of Mobilization Policy to advise the President, and upon
which labor was generously represented, the feuding ostensibly vanished.
113 97 Cong. Rec. 8580-606 (July 18, 1951).
114 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 451-63 (1951).
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Universal federal rent control was too harsh a medicine
for Congress to swallow undiluted. Although the Housing
and Rent Act of 1947,115 with its local option provisions, was
extended by the Defense Production Act amendments to
June 30, 1952, the rent control authority of the Housing
and Rent Act was placed in the President, to be administered
through the Economic Stabilization Agency rather than
through the Housing Expediter.'16 The Housing and Rent
Act was amended to provide for the imposition of federal
rent control where the state or political subdivision thereof
might request it."7 This provision was an improvement over
the local option provision to the extent that it allowed re-
control as well as de-control to be achieved by local option.
However, there was one nod in the direction of inflation by
a provision of the bill which permitted a 20% increase in
rents over the rent of June 30, 1947, with any previous
increases to be taken into account in computing the 20%.118
All through the hearings on rent control, members of the
Senate and House committee could not conceal their skep-
ticism as to the purity of the motives of the civilian control
agencies." 9 Nowhere was this more evident than in their
rejection of the proposal to put unrestricted rent re-control
authority in the Housing Expediter or the Economic Stabili-
zation Administrator. Their skepticism led them to bring the
Secretary of Defense into the picture. The Act, as it finally
emerged, provides that the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Defense Mobilization are to jointly determine
and certify any area as a critical defense housing area. When
this is done, and after credit restrictions are relaxed for that
area, rent control may be established. Specific criteria must
115 61 STAT. 196 (1947), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1881 et seq. (Supp.
1951).
116 Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-12 (1951).
117 Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(k) (1951).
118 Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(o) (1951).
119 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 748-9, where the members of the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee "roast" Mr. Tighe Woods, the Housing
Expediter.
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be met before an area is to be certified. The testimony of the
military departments as to the rent gouging prevalent around
military installations had a persuasive force with Con-
gress. 2 ° Nevertheless, Congress could not bring itself to
sanction federal rent control without the imprimatur of the
Secretary of Defense as to necessity. Despite the cumber-
some administrative procedure thus established, the Secre-
tary of Defense and the Director of Defense Mobilization,
spurred on perhaps by the dramatic reports of the Senate
Sub-Committee on Preparedness, have certified many areas
throughout the nation as critical defense housing areas where
rent control may be imposed.
12 1
The rent control picture, then, is a prototype of the gen-
eral congressional attitude toward the amended Defense
Production Act. Aware of a real need for controls, if mobili-
zation is to continue and inflation is to be curbed if not stop-
ped, Congress has given grudging assent to the continuance
of controls; but it has been very cautious so as to avoid
extending authority which, in its opinion, is not necessary or
which might be abused by overenthusiastic administrators.
Credit Controls
In an attempt to meet the inflationary threat which arose
with the Korean invasion, Congress in the original Defense
Production Act authorized the Board of Govenors of the
Federal Reserve to exercise consumer credit controls, 1 2 in
accordance with the famous Regulation W of World War II.
This regulation increased minimum allowable down pay-
ments and shortened maturities on most installment loans.
It had the effect of slowing down the rise in the total invest-
ment credit. In addition, the original Defense Production
120 SEN. Rap. No. 2250, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1950).
121 As of November 20, 1951, over 37 areas have been designated as critical
defense housing areas by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Defense
Mobilization and rent controls have been imposed therein. Defense Mobilization
Board Minutes 4, Nov. 7, 1951.
122 64 STAT. 812 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2131 (Supp. 1951).
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Act provided authority 123 for promulgation of Regulation X,
which placed down payment and maturity requirements on
new houses and commercial construction. This regulation
contributed substantially to the decline in the construction
of private housing units which, in turn, eased the demand for
important materials needed for defense construction.
The Administration attempted to strengthen and add to
these methods of credit control by proposing the amend-
ments to the Defense Production Act under a new sub-title,
Commodity Speculation, which would have amended the
Commodity Exchange Act 124 so as to authorize the Presi-
dent, when he deemed it necessary, to provide rules and
regulations covering margin requirements for speculative
transactions on commodity exchanges. 2 5
Not only did Congress reject this Administration proposal,
but it also proceeded to dilute the credit control measures
previously in effect. For instance, Regulation W was altered
so as to permit smaller down payments and additional time
for payment of installment purchases.2 6 In addition, the
Defense Production Act amendments substantially relaxed
the down payment and maturity requirements on houses
priced at $12,000 or less.1 27 Automobiles, household appli-
ances, including radios and television sets, and household
furniture were among the commodities upon which Congress
relaxed consumer credit controls. Paradoxically, some mem-
bers of Congress pressed successfully for relaxation of these
indirect methods of control, while at the very same time their
colleagues, and in some cases the same congressmen them-
selves, were arguing that before direct controls were re-en-
acted by Congress, there should be an attempt to utilize
indirect controls alone! The weakening of the credit control
123 64 STAT. 813 (1950), 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 2132 (Supp. 1951).
124 49 STAT. 1491 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1946).
125 H.R. 3871, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 611 (1951).




restrictions provoked some of the more serious criticisms
leveled at the Defense Production Act amendments by re-
sponsible administrators.
Although logical justification for this relaxation can be
made, in the end result it does appear that the movement
for watered-down credit controls in a period of increasing
inflation is an attempt to "have your cake and eat it too."
Although the 1951 tax legislation may serve to reduce the
inflationary effects of growing national security eipenditures,
and while savings have risen sharply in the last few months
as consumer buying has slackened,"' the impaired credit
controls present a large gap in our anti-inflationary armor.
Small Defense Plants Administration
Previous reference has been made above to the disadvant-
ageous position that the small businessman was occupying
in the defense effort. A plethora of capacity but a shortage
of vital materials had placed him in a squeeze. Cutback and
limitation orders forced him to curtail his civilian production,
but defense contracts which would take up the slack were
not forthcoming. It was inevitable that these pressures were
reflected in Congress. Various ideas were suggested by in-
dividual congressmen in an attempt to do something for
small business. These ranged from introduction of legislation
which would have provided for compulsory contracting or
subcontracting of a percentage of defense orders with small
businesses, 129 and which of course was an idea strenuously
opposed by military procurement officials, to the compara-
tively innocuous suggestion that there be a Government
coordinator in charge of small business affairs.' °
The legislative solution that became the new Section 714
of the Defense Production Act was the creation of an inde-
128 Three Keys tc Strength, op. cit. supra note 104, at 32.
129 H.R. 4204, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Representative Fogarty,
May 22, 1951.
130 S.J. Res. 49, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Senator Humphrey, March
12, 1951.
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pendent Small Defense Plants Administration. In the last
war there had been a Smaller War Plants Corporation,
13 1
which had authority to procure prime contracts from the
military departments and subcontract them out to be per-
formed by smaller business enterprises. It made loans and
gave technical assistance and advice to small business. It
was not unnatural that Congress turned to this device again,
even though some substantial differences do exist in the
legislative authority now granted to the Small Defense
Plants Administration and that granted to the SWPC in
World War II.
The bill originally introduced and passed by the House
was much more severe in its provisions and mandatory in
nature, requiring the procurement officers to follow the
decisions of the Small Defense Plants Administration in
many areas. 13 2 The bill that came out of the Senate was
much watered down. Senator Sparkman had originally intro-
duced a bill substantially identical in terms with the House
version.' However, the Senate Banking and Currency Com-
mittee refused to report it out. After it had been consider-
ably changed to meet objections against its mandatory tenor
voiced by the Department of Defense and other agencies
of the Government, Senator Sparkman reintroduced his bill
during the debate on the Defense Production Act.'34 It was
passed and when the conference adjourned, it emerged as
the version of the Small Defense Plants Administration au-
thority which Congress found acceptable.'35
It is too early to decide whether the exhortatory power
given to the Small Defense Plants Administration will con-
tribute much to the solution of the "fix" in which the small
131 56 STAT. 353 (1942).
132 H.R. REP. No. 639, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 30-2 (1951).
133 S. 1397, 82d Cong. 1st Sess., introduced by Senator Sparkman (and forty-
nine other senators), June 4, 1951.
134 97 Cong. Rec. 7597-602 (June 28, 1951).
135 Section 714, as added by Pub. L. No. 96, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 110
(July 31, 1951).
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businessman finds himself. It may be that the Administration
will make a substantial contribution by intelligent inventory
of the available productive facilities on a regional basis, and
with the cooperation of the procurement officers in those
regions, small business may benefit. On the other hand, be-
cause of its limited statutory powers, it may serve as a
powerless conduit of the complaints which will continually
arise because of the inability of small business to obtain a
greater share of defense contracts.
In summary, the Small Defense Plants Administration is
an independent agency for which a revolving fund of 50
million dollars was provided. This Administration is empow-
ered to recommend to the RFC loans to aid small business;
to enter into contracts with the United States Government
obligating the Administration to furnish materials, articles,
equipment and supplies to the Government; to arrange for
the performance of these contracts by letting subcontracts to
small business enterprises; and to provide technical and man-
agerial assistance to small business. The most important
function that it may perform is in carrying out the congres-
sional direction that it make a complete inventory of all fa-
cilities of small business concerns which can be used in the
defense program. The Department of Justice and at least one
congressional committee have called for a creation of a
centralized inventory as a necessary prerequisite to intelli-
gent procurement planning that would insure equitable use
of small business facilities. The Small Defense Plants Ad-
ministration may certify to procurement officers as to the
competency of small business with respect to credit and the
capacity to perform specific Government contracts. Procure-
ment officers would be required to accept the certification as
conclusive and would then be authorized to let a contract to
the concern certified without requiring it to meet any other
requirement of capacity or credit. Finally, in an attempt to
increase the availability of materials for small businesses,
specific provision was made by Congress that whenever ma-
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terials are allocated by law, a fair and equitable percentage
shall be allocated to small plants which are unable to obtain
the necessary materials or supplies from usual sources.
Conclusion
The Defense Production Act amendments of 1951 repre-
sent a victory for the point of view that America can
mobilize her industrial and military might, and at the same
time prevent a disastrous inflation, only by utilizing statu-
tory and administrative authority to direct strategic mater-
ials and services into defense channels, while keeping within
reasonable limitations the pressures of spiraling prices, wages
and rent. No particularly novel or important authority was
appended to the original Defense Production Act by the 1951
amendments. Nevertheless, by extending that original Act
and amending it in certain particulars, Congress acknowl-
edged the necessity for mobilization controls and, to that
extent, the Administration was successful in executing the
strategy mentioned at the outset of this article.
However, on the deficit side, at least from the point of
view of effective stabilization, the amendments contained
certain provisions which, if executed in accordance with the
strict letter, might open up disastrous holes in the dike of
anti-inflation control. It is possible, however, that these po-
tentially dangerous provisions may be repealed or modified.
Furthermore, Congress will get another opportunity to take
a look at the stabilization picture when the Act comes up
for another extension, if that is to be granted, in the summer
of 1952.
The success of the Defense Production Act, as amended,
will depend upon the temper of the times during which it is
enforced. If the American people persist in the belief that
the present hour is one of dire threat to our national security,
there should be no doubt that it can do the job for which
it was passed. On the other hand, if their will to sacrifice
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wavers, if they prefer their "butter" to their "guns," or if
they lose patience in attempting to follow a course of action
which may achieve both, then the Defense Production Act
will soon be wiped off the books, either by express congres-
sional action, or by its negation in actual practice. In the
opinion of this writer, either of the last two alternatives
would be indeed a "fool's" choice.
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